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Who Owns the Largest Firms Around the World? 
 
Abstract 
In this research-paper we evaluate how corporate control around the world is defined and which variables, related 
to a firm's characteristics and the countries' infrastructures, influence this. We find that there is a small number of 
countries where firms are widely held. The role of financial institutions seems to be different in civil and common 
law-based countries. While they seem to act as a monitor of management in common law-based countries, in civil 
law countries they act as a monitor of large shareholders. Finally, we find that firm's size is the most important 
determinant of ultimate owners. 
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1. Introduction 
Corporate ownership around the world is a present-day debate in finance. Concurrently, there is a connection 
between corporate control, corporate governance, and agency costs. Whereas there is a conflict of interests 
between shareholders and management in widely held firms (see Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)), there is another type of agency cost, with different players, when the expropriation of wealth 
occurs between minority shareholders and a larger block shareholder that simultaneously controls management 
and tries to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. When that is the case, the private benefits of large 
shareholders are higher than the costs of monitoring the management, and this is the reason why management and 
large shareholders have the same interests. Bebchuk (1999) develops a theory whereby the founders of public 
companies maintain a lock on control, because their private benefits are valuable enough to be captured by rivals. 
On the other hand, when corporate ownership is diffused, private benefits are not significant enough and the free 
rider problem concerning management monitoring will subsist (Shleifer and Vishny (1986). 
Recently, the discussion regarding the main forces that influence corporate ownership has been focused 
either on law and finance or on political economy. The influence of the legal system on shareholder rights 
standards is well documented (La Porta et al (1998) and Stulz and Williamsom (2003), for example). Common 
law-based countries, such as the US, offer higher shareholder protection, and consequently a larger blockholder is 
less necessary because the smaller ones are well protected. In fact, under those conditions, insiders have fewer 
opportunities to expropriate wealth from outsiders (La Porta et al (2000)). Corporate ownership is not only 
influenced by law, but also by political economy. Roe (2000), for example, defend this point of view. 
Furthermore, ignoring the importance of political economy can sometimes produce biased conclusions. For 
example, following the Great Depression and the consequent collapse of Italian investment banks, plus the dawn 
of the Fascist regime, the influence of the government on industrial companies increased, and consequently an 
undeveloped capital market emerged, with low investor protection. This explains why in the post-war period the 
Italian companies were family-owned. A similar event occurred in Portugal. After the Revolution of 1974, banks 
and industrial firms were nationalised, the stock exchange closed, and many investors lost their investments. When 
the companies were privatised at the end of the 80’s some were returned to the old owners whereas others 
remained in the hands of the government, even after they went public. Is it possible not to consider the consulate 
of Margaret Thatcher as regards to capital market development - namely through her privatisation decisions, 
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creating the popular capitalism -, and consequently its importance in terms of the changes in corporate ownership 
of UK firms?  
The perennial work of Berle and Means (1932), “The Modern Corporation and Private Property”, 
characterised the corporate ownership of the US firms as widely held by small shareholders, although the 
management has the control of the firm. This can be explained not only by the high standards of investor 
protection offered by the US legal system, but also by the low intervention of the government in private business. 
Nevertheless, according to several theorists, this result can not be extended to the rest of the world. According to 
Faccio and Lang (2002), based on a sample of Western European firms, show that ownership is not homogeneous. 
Their results reveal a large number of widely held firms in the UK and Ireland, in comparison to continental 
Europe. They also show that the smallest firms and the industrial firms are more family-owned than financial 
institutions, and in some countries the state plays a decisive role in the biggest firms. Claessens et al (2000), using 
a sample of 2,980 East Asian companies from 9 countries, show how firms from that region are largely family-
owned (Japanese firms are an exception), as well as how corporate wealth is in the hands of a few families. 
Likewise, Majluf et al (1998) and Valadares and Leal (2000) show, either for Chile or for Brazil respectively, how 
representative the largest shareholders in the firms of those countries are. La Porta et al (1999) confirm the idea 
that in countries with higher antidirector rights, namely in the US, in which investors are well protected, the 
corporate ownership is widely held. On the contrary, they also show that countries with low shareholder 
protection, in which the state interferes in private business, the largest firms are more family-owned, the voting 
rights are separate from the cash flow rights, namely through multiple classes of stock, cross-shareholdings, and 
pyramidal structures, and the ownership is less diffused. More recently, Holderness (2005), based on a sample of 
23 countries, refused the idea that corporate ownership in US firms is more diffused than in other countries 
because the largest shareholders in US firms act as managers, not as monitors, and consequently the level of 
investor protection cannot be the explanation for corporate ownership concentration. 
The main objective of our paper is to evaluate if there is a clear relationship between shareholder rights 
and corporate ownership and, on the other hand, if other country-level variables such as disclosure level, 
corruption standards, or size of local financial industry, produce more powerful results to explain corporate 
ownership.  
In this research we found a small number of countries like Australia, the UK and the US, where corporate 
ownership is widely diffused. The results obtained in this research paper point out that threshold influence the 
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percentage of widely held firms. We found 15.9% and 39.5% of widely held firms, on average by country, for 5% 
and 20% threshold respectively. Prior results are dependent of the large number of firms whose ultimate owners 
are financial institutions at 5% threshold, but not at 20%. This occurs in common law-based countries and in 
countries where the quality of enforcement presents higher standards. It seems that financial institutions act as a 
monitor of management. In civil-law based countries, on the contrary, financial institutions act as a monitor of a 
larger shareholder that is simultaneously the management. Finally, the particularity of each country makes it 
difficult to find macro variables as determinants of ultimate owners. As a matter of fact, and contrarily to block 
holdings, we only found in firm’s size statistical significance as determinant of the ultimate owner.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the variables and definitions, the methodology, and 
the data. Section 3 characterises the corporate ownership structure for a sample of 32 countries, namely their 
owners and the way the control is owned. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data, Definitions of Variables, and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
This paper is based fundamentally on the information obtained from the Factset/Lionshares database, annual 
reports, books, and websites of firms that detail their ownership structures. For securities traded on the major US 
exchanges, Factset Lionshares obtained institutional ownership information via 13F filings, as well as by adding 
shares held by the mutual funds managed by a particular institution. This method is also used when shares traded 
on other stock exchanges are considered. Insider/declarable stakes data are collected through many reports, 
namely insider filings, registration forms, public company annual reports and interim financial statements.  
Our data concerns the end of 2005, more precisely the period between December 2005 and March 2006, 
depending on the information supplied by firms. We selected the 20 largest firms by country, according to the 
results obtained from the Worldscope database (Worldscope item, WC08001), for the following countries: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, South 
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the UK, and the US.  
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2.2. Definitions of Variables 
While voting rights determine corporate control, cash flow rights are used to evaluate corporate ownership. It is 
important to distinguish both concepts because they usually present different results, particularly when the 
shareholdings are based on pyramidal structures, a way of large shareholders to obtain control with the least 
amount of capital. For example, if investor A holds 5% of shares of firm X, and simultaneously 20% of shares of 
firm Y, which in its turn also owns 10% of firm X, then we may say that A has 7% (5%+20%*10%) of cash flow 
rights and controls 15% of voting rights (min(10%,20%)+5%). Moreover, differences between voting rights and 
cash flow rights are particularly sensitive to dual class voting shares. For example, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., the 
US holding company managed by Warren Buffet, has two classes of common stock, Class A and Class B. A share 
of Class B common stock has the rights of 1/30th of a share of Class A common stock except that a Class B share 
has 1/200th of the voting rights of a Class A share (rather than 1/30th of the vote). Considering that Berkshire 
Hathaway Inc. has issued 1,261 million and 8,407 million Class A and B shares respectively, we conclude that the 
0,498 million Class A shares owned by Warren Buffet represent 32% of cash flow rights and 38% of voting rights.  
Thus, whenever a firm presents dual class voting shares we use the percentage of voting shares, following 
the related literature. In other words, we are assuming a parallel between voting rights and number of shares, when 
a company has only issued a single class of shares. This is particularly relevant for Scandinavian countries, where 
dual class voting shares are commonly used. The Social Democratic approach of Nordic politics has played an 
important role in the cooperation between capital and labour interests and the maintenance of property rights has 
been the response to that purpose. Such view has permitted firms the use of different class voting shares and 
pyramidal structures in order to maintain property rights and wealth in their countries and simultaneously to 
discourage new outsiders, promoting corporate financing through internal resources or banking financing, placing 
less emphasis on capital market development (Högfeldt (2004)). 
In this research, we do not consider some mechanisms used by firms to impede takeovers such as voting 
caps, golden shares, and voting blocks. We have collected only ultimate owners that own more than 5% of voting 
rights of a firm. We assume that a ultimate owner has a stake in firm if he owns 5% or 20% of voting rights, 
depending on the threshold we are considering. These figures are in line with recent research, for example, 
Holderness (2005) and La Porta et al (1999) who chose 5%, 10%, and 20% respectively. The ultimate owner 
percentage of voting rights takes into account the American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) stakes. There are few 
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examples of shareholders in possession of a qualified participation as a result of a simultaneous investment in 
common stocks and ADRs. The prior procedure is also used for ultimate owners. 
It was a hard task trying to define precisely an ultimate shareholder. In fact, we had to use a large number 
of sources, namely sites and different type of books (history, economics, management magazines, etc). We will 
provide three examples. Lionshares database defines Investor AB, a Swedish company, as an investment advisor. 
However, this company is controlled by the Wallenberg family. The Wallenbergs are one of the most influential 
and wealthy families in Sweden, renowned as bankers and industrialists. Thus, we define Investor AB as a firm 
controlled by individuals. Another example is Temasek Holdings, a company defined as investment advisor by 
Lionshares database, but controlled by the government of Singapore, with the main objective of taking stakes in a 
variety of local companies. Finally, Corporacion Financiera Alba SA is the largest shareholder of Actividades de 
Construcción y Servicios, one of the largest Spanish companies in terms of development, construction and 
management of infrastructures. The Lionshares database defines Corporacion Financiera Alba SA as a private 
company, although it is controlled by the Delgado family, who has 19.7% of total voting rights. Thus we define 
the owner of Corporacion Financiera Alba SA as individual.
1
 
We define the following ultimate owners: 
 Individual - when a given person (or a group of given people) is the sole shareholder who controls a 
significant percentage of voting rights, we define that firm as individually controlled. For example, the 
Mayr Melnhof family owns 60% of voting rights of Mayr-Melnhof Karton AG, an Austrian company, 
that produces recycled fibre based cartonboard and manufactures folding cartons. Nevertheless, the 
relation between the individuals is not always easy to observe. For example, Anadolu Efes Biracilik ve 
Malt Sanayii A.S., a Turkish company whose activities are related to beer, malt, and soft drinks, has three 
shareholders that own more than 5% of voting rights. The Yazici and Ozilhan families with 29.8% and 
17.3% respectively of total voting rights do not offer any doubt. But what about Anadolu Endustri 
Holding AS, a holding company with 7.8% of voting rights, who are the ultimate owners in this case? 
After a research in management magazines and sites, we found that the referred holding was controlled 
by the Yazici family; 
                                                 
1 Actividades de Construcción y Servicios also have more two shareholders with more than 5%: Imvernelin Patrimonio SL, a private firm according to Lionshares database, but 
effectively controlled by Alberto Cortina and Alberto Alcocer (9.7% of total voting rights); and an individual ownership of Florentino Rodriguez Perez (7.4% of total voting 
rights). Thus, we have only individuals controlling Actividades de Construccion y Servicios, and such firm, according to our definition, must be seen as individually owned, 
whatever the threshold considered. 
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 Government - when a state is the sole shareholder that controls a significant percentage of voting rights, a 
firm is government owned. For example, Mobistar, a Belgium wireless telecommunications firm, is 
owned by France Telecom, a public company. It has 50.2% of voting rights of Mobistar and no other 
shareholder owns more than 5% of voting rights. However, the French government owns 32.5% of voting 
rights of France Telecom and it is the only shareholder who also owns more than 5% of voting rights. In 
this case Mobistar is seen as government owned; 
 Financial Institution - when a financial institution (or a group of firms related to asset management) is 
(are) the relevant ultimate owner(s) we can say that the ultimate owner is obviously a financial institution. 
We include the following kind of firms and qualified participations: investments made by bank and 
insurance management divisions; shares registered in brokers; hedge fund companies; investment 
advisors; mutual fund companies; pension funds; and, private equity firms. For example, Fosters Group, 
an Australian beverages firm, has the following shareholders with more than 5% of voting rights: 
Mondrian Investment Partners Ltd with 7.3% (Investment Advisor); Capital Research & Management Co 
with 7.2% (Investment Advisor); Colonial First State Investments Ltd with 6.1% of voting rights (Bank 
Management Division); and, Maple-Brown Abbot Ltd with 6% (Investment Advisor); 
 Financial Vehicle - We define a financial vehicle as a firm that was created to control another one, for 
example, holding companies, or very specific cases of companies, such as foundations (very common in 
Denmark and Italy, for example), and firms that result from cooperatives or mutual objectives (for 
example, Rabobank is a Dutch cooperative banking institution with offices all over the world), and 
trustees (for example, Leverhulme trust, a British research and educational charity). An example of a firm 
controlled by a financial vehicle is Carlsberg A/S, the renowed Danish brewer, whose foundation owns 
79.5% of total voting rights; 
 Diverse shareholders - We define a firm as with diverse shareholders when a company presents 
shareholders of different provenances. For example, PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, a telecommunications 
company in Indonesia, is controlled by the government (51.2% of total voting rights), although Capital 
Research & Management Co also owns 8.8% of total voting rights; 
On the contrary, when there is no ultimate owner a firm is defined as widely held – this definition is only 
used for ultimate owners. That is, when there is no ultimate owner with more than 5% of total voting rights. 
Such is, for example, the case of Banco Santander Central Hispano, the largest Spanish bank.  
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2.3. Methodology 
We intend to observe the ownership structure of firms from countries at several stages of economic development 
(developed and developing countries), with different sources of law (civil and common law-based), and with 
distinct financial systems (banking-based or capital market-based). 
We decided to choose 20 firms by country, in line with La Porta et al (1999). The main reason to choose 20 
firms by country is related to the very small number of public companies. For a large number of countries, 
experience shows that it is illogical to think there are much more than 20 public companies. The presence of more 
than 20 firms in the Austrian, New Zealand, and Portuguese case means the inclusion of many more non public 
companies than in other countries. Even in other countries where we would expect such number to be easily 
exceeded, like Spain or South Korea, we must take care with possible unexpected results. Table 1, Panel A, shows 
that the 20 largest firms by country represent between 19.8% (Japan) and 96% (Portugal) of local market 
capitalisation. In average, the 20 largest firms are responsible for 70.2% of local market capitalisation. 
The way we found to evaluate whether there is any influence of firm variables or country infrastructure 
variables on corporate ownership is to control them. This will permit us not only to verify the similarities and 
differences across countries, but also to analyse which are the main determinants of corporate ownership. Thus, 
we use the following firm-level variables: 
 Size - We expect a negative relationship between firm size and fraction of corporate control, ceteris 
paribus. Wealth constraints, in addition to risk aversion imply that a blockholder (and an ultimate owner) 
is less able to accomplish as a firm becomes larger (Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Prowse (1992) and 
Holderness (2005)); 
 Volatility - A firm with more volatile profit rate is more difficult to monitor and to control, and as a result 
the level of ownership concentration is expectably higher, in order to avoid eventual abuses by 
management (Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Prowse (1992), and Himmelberg et al (1999) document 
different results for such relationship); 
 Market-to-Book - This variable is seen as a proxy for the growth opportunities of a firm.  We expect that 
a firm with more growth opportunities, and also with more doubts by investors, would develop easily in a 
developed capital market. Kahn and Winton (1998) and Goergen and Renneboog (1998), show in 
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theoretical and empirical terms respectively, that the ownership retention by the initial shareholders will 
be lower, after an IPO, on firms characterised by growth opportunities with need of external finance. 
With regard to country-level variables the following are used: 
 Legal Environment – We use legal country origin and anti-director rights as measures of legal 
environment. Country origin is divided in the two main important legal families, common and civil law 
origins. Anti-director rights is an index outlined by La Porta et al (1998). We expect a positive 
relationship between diffuse corporate ownership structures and common law-based countries, 
particularly when the agency problem concerns management-shareholder (see La Porta et al (1999)). In 
line with prior assumption, we expect that the higher the investor protection rights are, the lower the 
possibility of expropriating wealth is from the smallest ones by management; 
 Quality of Enforcement - La Porta et al (1998) using some variables of law enforcement, namely 
corruption and rule of law, considered in this research, conclude that Scandinavian countries present the 
highest standards, contrarily to Fench civil law countries. In this research the level of corruption is an 
index produced by Transparency Internacional, named Corruption Perception Index, and Rule of Law is 
from La Porta et al (1998). Those authors also conclude, considering the three largest shareholders in the 
ten largest non-financial (privately owned) firms by country, that Fench civil law countries present the 
highest concentration of ownership. Li et al (2006) using an enforcement index,  whose components are  
rule of law, regulatory quality, and absence of corruption, show that there is positive impact of such 
variable on ownership held by institutional blockholders; 
 Corporate Disclosure – More diffused ownership structures in countries where accounting and financial 
disclosure present higher standards (see La Porta et al (1998)) is expected. In fact, in that case it is easier 
to monitor the management (and large shareholders decisions) and consequently to avoid the 
expropriation of wealth from minority shareholders. However, that relationship must be taken with 
caution, because, for example, Guedhami and Pittman (2006), for a group of privatised firms from 31 
countries, find weak evidence between ownership concentration and disclosure standards;  
 Religion - Local beliefs produce impacts on different areas of economy. Weber (1904) in his notable 
book, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”, found that Protestantism, in particular in 
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Calvinism, as a means of explaining capitalism
2
 and it will be used to test if there is, as we expect, a 
positive relationship between non Catholic religion and the existence of ultimate owners; 
 Economic, Stock Market, Banking, and Financial Institutional Environment - Financial decisions taken 
by firms depend on the level of capital market development. In some financial markets, like the US and 
the UK, which are clearly market-based, the issue of equity is a natural source of finance for firms.
3
 The 
opportunities in a developed capital market induce firms to issue equity; in this case, we expect a lower 
ownership concentration ratio for developed capital markets. In fact, as Dyck and Zingales (2002) 
conclude, in countries with less developed capital markets the private benefits of control are higher and 
the ownership is more concentrated. We use the liquidity ratio as a proxy for capital market development. 
Liquidity ratio is defined as volume traded at a local stock exchange divided by the gross domestic 
product (GDP). Private credit is also used to evaluate if a banking system influence corporate ownership. 
Financial literature found a positive relationship between the development of banking and capital market, 
and thus a positive relationship between private credit and diffused ownership structures is expected. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999) show that in higher income countries, the overall financial system 
becomes larger, although they tend to be more market-based. Domestic credit provided by banking sector 
% of GDP, from World Bank, is the measure of private credit. The level of economic development 
measured by GDP per capita will be used to evaluate if different economic conditions influence the 
percentage of widely held firms. Finally, because there is a positive relationship between the size of 
mutual fund industry, a proxy for financial institutional development, and strong rules and laws (see 
Khorana et al (2005)), we test if the same occurs between diffused ownership and the level of 
development of financial institutions.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 
In the Renaissance period, contrarily to Catholic religion which defended a fairly luxurious way of life, emerged in the 16th century a group of reformists, namely Martin 
Luther and John Calvin, of the Catholic church, who started a religious movement, later designated as the Protestant Reformation. Protestants defended that hard work led to 
prosperity and a life without luxury. From their asceticism resulted an accumulation of capital, which inspired the beginning of capitalism. But the impact of religion on 
economy, and more particularly on firms’ corporate control, should be extended to the Franciscans, a Roman Catholic Order created in the 13th century. In fact, that Order 
played an important role on the economy since the 15th century, particularly through the implementation of "Montes Pietatis", financial institutions with mutual purposes. These 
institutions, in order to protect persons from usurers, loaned money with exclusively charitable and solidarity ends. 
3
 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) show the importance of a well-developed financial market for industries with more need of external finance. A firm whose growth depends on 
external capital will grow more rapidly in a developed stock market. According to Demirguk and Levine (1999), there is a positive relationship between market-based financial 
systems, and strong shareholder rights protection, good accounting regulations, and low levels of corruption. 
 11 
3. Results 
First, we identify the ultimate owners of the 20 largest firms by country. More diffused ownership structures in 
developed capital markets, where shareholders are well protected, with higher transparency standards, and 
disclosure levels is expected. In this research, it will be important to evaluate if the stakes of ultimate owners are 
explained by macro variables, as legal environment, quality of enforcement, corporate disclosure, historical 
foundations, and the economic environment, or on the other hand, because the largest firms around the world are 
being considered, restrictions of wealth are more important to explain either block holdings or ultimate owners.  
Table 1, Panels A and B, shows the percentage of firms controlled by category of ultimate owner, 
considering 5% and 20% threshold. Financial institutions control a significant percentage of largest firms of 
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and South Africa for a 5% threshold. However, when threshold is 20% the 
percentage of firms controlled by financial institutions is highly reduced (from 18.1% to 5%, on average by 
country). For example, not one Canadian firm is controlled by a financial institution, when 20% threshold is 
considered. However, 65% of Canadian firms of our sample are controlled by a financial institution when 
threshold is 5%. These results are in line with the idea that financial institutions under financial and risk 
constraints prefer to act as a monitor of management. Malaysia and Portugal present a significant percentage of 
firms (70%) whose owners have a different origin. Contrarily to financial institutions, when we analyse firms 
controlled by diverse shareholders there is no change considering 5% or 20% threshold. In fact, Panels A and B, 
show that diverse shareholders own, on average, 28.9% (25.9%) of sample for 5% (20%) threshold. In this case, 
we suspect that there are many firms where a minoritary ultimate owner with a stake higher than 5% controls a 
large shareholder that is simultaneously the management. Probably, this occurs in countries where ultimate owners 
are less protected and the benefits obtained of monitoring a large ultimate owner by a minority one are higher. 
Panels A and B, of Table 1, also show that threshold does not produce significant changes on the percentage of 
firms controlled by individuals (from 17.3% to 15.2%, on average by country). In this case it is plausible to say 
that management and controller are the same entity, since the percentage of voting rights often exceeds 20%. Chile 
and Turkey are the most represented countries in terms of control by individuals. On the opposite extreme are 
Australia, Ireland, Japan, South Africa, and the UK.  Financial vehicles, contrarily to individuals, are influenced 
by the threshold chosen. The percentage of firms owned by financial vehicles varies from 7.7% to 3.3%, for 5% 
and 20% threshold respectively. However, while in some countries threshold does not seem to not produce 
different results (e.g., Belgium and Denmark), there are others where the influence of financial vehicles changes 
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with threshold (e.g., Austria, Italy, and Spain). Those countries had a period of mutualisation as a common 
characteristic. That is, a period where the firm’s main objective was not to obtain profits, but to help a cause. It is 
possible to observe that trend in Belgium, through Cera Holding, a cooperative Group, with important stakes on 
KBC, AGFA, and Almancora, some of the largest Belgian firms, in Denmark where local foundations control 
large Danish firms (for example, Carlsberg, Danske Bank, and H. Lundbeck), and in Spain, where the major 
Catalan bank, La Caixa, controls Telefonica, Telefonica Mobiles, Banco Sabadel, and Repsol. The history and 
culture seems to influence the firm’s control in some countries. On the other hand, firms controlled by the state are 
not influenced by threshold. In fact, 11.1% (12.0%) of firms from the sample are owned by states for 20% (5%) 
threshold. Table 1 shows how Asian governments influence their economy. India, Singapore, and Thailand are its 
main exponents. For example, Temasek Holding, an investor advisor owned by the Singaporean government, 
controls some local large firms (e.g., DBS Group, Keppel Corp, Capitaland, Singapore Airlines, Chartered 
Semiconductor, Neptune Orient Lines, and Starhub). Table 1 also shows that a widely held firm is dependent from 
threshold. In fact, the percentage of firms without controller varies from 15.9% (5% threshold) to 39.5% (20% 
threshold). However, it is difficult to conclude that a shareholder with 5% of voting rights controls a firm. In fact, 
the difference from 5% to 20% threshold must be attributed to the change observed on firms supposedly controlled 
by financial institutions, but that in reality act as a monitor of management. In spite of large ownership 
concentration around the world, there are many large firms where the agency cost is focused on the relationship 
between manager and a minority shareholder. This evidence is not observed in Malaysia, Portugal, and Turkey. In 
these countries the conflict of interest is based on the relationship between large and minority shareholders. 
Summing up, there are some signs that ultimate owners are a puzzling issue because is dependent of 
country specific infrastructure, political foundations, and economic characteristics. However, because such 
countries each had their own development, many times the singularity of each country may not be observed 
through macro variables, as corruption index or religion. For example, some large firms from Japan and Thailand 
are controlled by the government, although they have different legal origins, shareholders are differently 
protected, and the level of corruption is significantly different. While in Japan the state decided to maintain the 
control of some firms, as in Japan Tobacco, Resona Holdings, Nippon Telegraph & Telephone, NTT Domo, and 
Nissan (controlled by Renault, a firm owned by the French government), in Thailand the local government has 
been helped by the Singaporean government in order to maintain the control of local firms in security hands (for 
example, ADV Info Service and Shin Corp). Thus, it is a difficult task to find the main determinants of corporate 
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ownership once its result is the consequence of singular policies. In this research, such is more difficult due to our 
small sample of 32 countries.    
Table 2, Panel A, reports summary statistics of country-level variables. The sample represents different 
country infrastructures because, in general, variables show a wide variation. For example, there are (i) 15 
countries, where shareholders are protected (anti-director rights higher than 4), (ii) 12 common law-based 
countries, and (iii) 11 Catholic countries. This result explains why the sample has many capital market and 
banking-based countries (see, for example, Demirguk and Levine (1999)). Corruption level and rule of law, on the 
other hand, do not exhibit significant changes as other variables. Only 4 countries display a lower GDP per capita 
(< 10.000 dollars), as well as 3 with lower score for rule of law (< 3), which confirms that most of countries are 
developed economies. In fact, emerging capital markets are only represented by Chile, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey. Concerning firm-level variables (Panel B) it 
must be stated that G-7 countries present the largest firms around the world. The median market capitalisation of 
the 20 largest firms of those countries exceeds 15 billion dollars. Firms from Chile, Indonesia, Ireland, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Thailand, and Turkey, in their turn, present a median market capitalisation inferior to 3 billion 
dollars, reflecting once more how heterogeneous the sample is. In relation to market-to-book it must be focused 
that the result obtained for the US, significantly higher than in most countries, illustrates the importance of the US 
capital market for firms with growth opportunities. Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey, on the other hand, as 
emerging countries exhibit the highest volatility. 
 In Table 3, Panels A and B, the percentage on mean of firms owned by type of ultimate owner are 
exhibited, considering 5% and 20% as threshold. Means are grouped following the criteria alluded to in section 3. 
In general, when 5% threshold is used there are more significant differences between groups of countries. In fact, 
when the stakes of ultimate owners are being analysed, results are not independent of threshold. A possible reason 
for such differences concerns the role of financial institutions in the control of firms. While in some rich countries 
with common legal environment, high quality of enforcement, high disclosure level and developed capital 
markets, like Australia, Canada, Ireland, the UK, and the US, amongst others, financial institutions are the only 
ultimate owner having a stake in firms that, generally varying from 5% to10%, (see Table 3, Panels A and B, 
concerning differences on mean between common and civil law-based countries, high versus low anti-director 
rights, high versus low corruption perception index, high versus low disclosure level, and it is confirmed that 
means are different for 5% threshold, but not for 20%), in some less developed capital markets whose enforcement 
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presents low quality, financial institutions are not the only ultimate owner and usually their stakes also vary from 
5% to 10% (see Panels A and B, concerning diverse shareholders and differences on mean between high versus 
low corruption perception index, and it is confirmed either for 5% or for 20% threshold that in countries with high 
standards of corruption there are more firms with diverse ultimate owners). This occurs usually, for example, in 
Greece, India, Indonesia, and Taiwan, amongst others.  For example, in Indonesia Capital Research & 
Management and local government have important stakes in the same firms (PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, PT 
Perusahaan Gas Negara and PT Bank Mandiri). As in prior results, it seems that while in less developed capital 
markets financial institutions act as a monitor of management, in undeveloped capital markets financial 
institutions act as monitor of majority shareholder that is simultaneously the management. An important result of 
this research concerns the non definitive relationship between widely-held firms and law. Common law-based 
countries present more diffused corporate control structures but without statistical significance (see Table 3, 
Panels A and B). This result contrasts with La Porta et al (1999) since their results indicate a positive relationship 
between anti-director standards (highly related to law) and diffused ownership structures. In fact, the agency 
problem between management and shareholders would be avoided in countries where the shareholders were well-
protected and it would reflect itself in a more diffused ownership structure. But not infrequently management and 
the majority shareholders are the same entity and the agency problem arises in the relationship between larger and 
minority shareholders. Thus, the question that we should ask is: Are agency theory, law and finance reasons 
enough to explain the corporate control? It seems not. Or on the other hand, do we have to consider other 
perspectives like the privatisation policies taken by the states, the way of thinking of governments, more liberal or 
more social democratic, or the quality of enforcement (analysing either corruption standards or rule of law). Who 
would like to invest in a country where public institutions do not perform well their role? Or in other words: What 
dominates what? Is political economy more important than law and finance or are both equally important? 
Probably both are important and it is difficult to conclude which factor is more relevant. In common law-based 
countries firms are more controlled by financial institutions firms than in civil ones, as we noted. Capital markets 
are more developed in these countries, issuers provide more information, financial industry is highly developed. 
However, it must be enhanced that this result can not be extensible to all common law-based countries, as we 
observed. For example, in Hong Kong, India and Thailand we do not witness any firm controlled by a financial 
institution. On the contrary, in those countries, there are many firms controlled by the government. However, they 
are common-law based. Thus, there are some reasons to believe in the importance of political economy on 
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corporate control. Table 3, Panels A and B, shows that individuals exercise higher control over firms in civil-law 
based countries (always significant at 1% level of statistical significance). We identify the following plausible 
reasons for such result: First, shareholders are less protected in civil-law based countries and consequently it is 
necessary that a larger shareholder controls the management; Second, individuals are often the founders of the 
firms and do not like to divide the lock of control in order to share the private benefits with minority shareholders; 
Third, in civil-law based countries apparently there are some signs that firms are smaller and consequently they 
are more easily controlled by individuals. Moreover, there are other reasons for a family business to grow fast in 
less developed capital markets with lower disclosure levels and lower quality of enforcement, although differences 
on mean for such criteria have not been found: Following a long period in which the state assumed a relevant role, 
many firms were privatised and the governments for a number of reasons prefer to sell firms to locals. Moreover, 
some privatised firms were located in sectors with many restrictions to develop an activity, if not faced with 
monopolies.  Thus, it is understandable how such families create wealth so fast. Chile and Turkey, for example, 
belong to the group of countries where such process occurred. In Chile the wave of privatisations from 1974 to 
1979 and from 1984 to 1989 created the Angelini, Luksic, and Matte groups. In Turkey, the privatisation 
movement started in the mid 80’s, with obstacles, many of them related to work/labour force, delaying its end to 
recent years. During that period some Turkish families and individuals increased their wealth buying firms owned 
by the state, creating conglomerates, namely the Dogan Aydin and Koc and Sabancy families. In fact, corporate 
ownership is a puzzle issue, where law and finance and political economy both assume importance to explain it.  
There are many common-law based countries whose economy has recently adhered to market economy, and even 
though some of them prefer to maintain the lock of control of firms in the hands of the government, particularly in 
sectors related to the offer of national interest goods, such as water, telecommunications, and railways, amongst 
others. This is the case of Hong Kong where MTR Corporation (railways), Boc Hong Kong (bank), Cnooc Ltd (oil 
and gas), China Mobile (wireless telecommunications), China Unicom (major telecommunications), and China 
Netcom Group (major telecommunications) are directly owned by the government of the People’s Republic of 
China. This example helps to understand why some countries with the same legal origin, present different patterns 
in terms of ultimate owners. For example, in Hong Kong, India, Singapore and Thailand there are many firms 
controlled by the government, contrarily to Canada, Ireland, Malaysia, South Africa, the UK and the US. In Table 
5, Panels A and B, also shows that there are differences on mean in some criteria when financial vehicles are being 
analysed. In common law and Catholic-based countries (although this criteria accounts for only 5% threshold) 
 16 
financial vehicles play a more relevant role in the control of firms. This is mainly a consequence of different 
political and economic models produced by countries along the years, particularly in some continental European 
countries, namely in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, and Spain. The historical presence of institutions with 
mutual and cooperative interests is a plausible explanation for such result and explains why civil-law based 
countries present higher means when we analyse firms controlled by this type of shareholders. In Italy, since the 
15th century there have been many financial institutions with mutual origins that were inspired by Franciscan 
principles, the old "Montes Pietatis". These institutions loaned money in cash with the guarantee of a pledge, 
without interest, and with exclusively charitable and solidarity ends, in order to protect individuals from usurers. 
From this process resulted many "fondaziones" some of them subsequent to the 18th century, which are nowadays 
not only the main important shareholders of some Italian banks, but additionally of some foreign banks. For 
example, the largest ultimate shareholder from Unicredito, the major Italian bank, that controls the German bank 
Bayerische Hypo und Vereinsbank AG and the Austrian bank Bank Austria Creditanstalt, is Fondazione Cassa 
Risparmio Verona Vicenza Belluno Anco. Crédit Agricole, a French institution with a mutual mission, and 
Fondazione Cariplo - Cassa di Risparmio delle Provincie are the largest shareholders of Banca Intesa, the second 
largest Italian bank. The financial Italian movement was followed in Spain. In fact, the process ended on "cajas de 
ahorros", although some of them are currently private companies. The most relevant example of the importance of 
these financial institutions is La Caixa, a Catalan bank, the major ultimate shareholder of Banco Sabadell, Repsol, 
and Telefonica. In Austria there are also many institutions with mutual aims. For example, Raiffeisen, one of the 
largest banking groups in the country is a cooperative bank owned by 9 regional banks, and Wiener Städtische, the 
largest Austrian Insurance company, and one of the most important in Central Europe was managed until 1992 
with a legal form of a mutual insurance company. Also in Belgium, Almancora, an investment management 
company, has Cera Holding as its main important ultimate owner, a cooperative financial group. Another example 
is Agfa - Gevaert NV, a Belgium electronic company controlled by KBC Group, which in its turn is controlled by 
Almancora (owned by Cera Holding), Boerenbond Group (a farmers association whose main objective is to 
protect farmers against unfair commercial practices) and Cera Holding. Denmark, on the other hand, is the land of 
foundations. For example, Carlsberg A/S, the famous brewer, is controlled by Carlsberg foundation and H 
Lundbeck A/S and Novo Nordisk A/S, the Danish Pharmaceuticals, are governed, respectively by Lundbeck 
Fonden and Novo Nordisk Fonden. 
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Summing up, although it seems that ultimate owners have been influenced by the way capitalism was 
created in each country. That is, many countries were influenced by mutual environment, the role of the state has 
had different interpretations and is highly observed in many Asian countries, in some less developed countries like 
Chile and Turkey individuals play an important role in the economy, in other countries like Singapore and South 
Africa institutions were created to deal with social insurance that have an important role in the local capital 
markets, in some common-law based countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the US) 
financial institutions are comparatively an important type of blockholder and ultimate owner, and in Nordic 
countries dual class shares is typical and was the way local governments, social democratic oriented, chose to 
maintain the control of firms.  However, all the countries have common restrictions of wealth, and at least it would 
be the most popular determinant of corporate ownership. The remaining determinants, on the contrary, are country 
specific.   
Table 4 present a multivariate analysis, from which we intended to evaluate the determinants of ultimate 
owners, considering the percentage of widely held firms by country as the dependent variable, for a 20% of 
threshold. The results confirm that when we are analysing ultimate owners only market capitalisation matters. 
Wealth restriction is the explanation for the influence of market capitalisation on the percentage of widely held 
firms by country. On the contrary, we do not identify any country variable that influences the percentage of widely 
held firms because, as we noted, each capital market has had its own history, that is to say, a specific process of 
development, impeding the establishment of international patterns.       
 
4. Conclusion 
The main objective of this research paper is to evaluate how corporate control is performed in the largest firms of 
32 countries with different country and firm-level characteristics. For that purpose we consider the concept of 
ultimate owner.   
As expected there is a small number of countries like Australia, the UK, and the US, where corporate 
ownership is widely diffused. This research paper shows that threshold influences the percentage of widely held 
firms. In fact, there are 15.9% of widely held firms, on mean by country, when 5% threshold is chosen, that 
compares with 39.5% for 20% threshold. This result derives from the large number of firms whose ultimate 
owners are financial institutions at 5% threshold, but not at 20%. This relationship is very popular in common-law 
based countries, as well as in countries where the quality of enforcement presents higher standards. Under those 
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infrastructures, financial institutions seem to act as a monitor of management. On the contrary, when we are in the 
presence of countries where shareholders are not well protected, typically in civil-law based countries, financial 
institutions act as a monitor of a larger shareholder, that is simultaneously the management. It seems that a 
financial institution has benefits of monitoring management in a common-law based country and of monitoring a 
larger shareholder in a civil one.  
The particularity of each country makes it difficult to find macro variables for determinants of ultimate 
owners. In fact, in many countries of continental Europe, namely in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Spain, 
with different country infrastructures, where there is a significant number of firms whose ultimate owners have 
mutual origin; in many Asian countries, independently of enforcement standards, there is a significant number of 
firms controlled by the state (Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand); in Ireland and New Zealand 
there is a significant number of firms controlled by financial institutions; in Turkey and Chile individuals are the 
most observed ultimate owner; in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US there are many 
widely held firms and their infrastructures are also different. In this last case, the firm’s size and wealth restriction 
are the explanations for such result. As a matter of fact, and contrarily to block holdings, we only found a degree 
of statistical significance in firm’s size as a determinant of ultimate owner. This was expected because a block 
holding stake is generally higher than one owned by an ultimate owner. 
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Table 1: Ultimate Owners – Percentage of Firms by Country 
This table exhibits the percentage of firms owned by type of ultimate owners, using 5% and 20% threshold. Ultimate 
owners with more than 5% of votes are included on the sample. A firm whose ultimate owners own less than 20% is 
considered widely held at 20% threshold. Ultimate owner classification is defined in section 2.2. % of country market 
capitalisation is the relationship between the market capitalisation of the largest twenty firms¸ obtained in Worldscope, 
and total market capitalisation (Datastream country indexes are used as country market capitalisation). 
                                                            Panel A: Threshold 5% 
Country 
% of 
Country Financial Diverse Individuals Financial Government Widely 
 Market Cap Institution Shareholders Vehicle  Held 
Australia 68.2 35 5 0 0 5 55 
Austria 84.9 0 45 10 30 5 10 
Belgium 86.4 5 25 20 30 10 10 
Canada 46.3 65 5 15 0 0 15 
Chile 75.2 5 30 45 15 0 5 
Denmark 85.9 40 15 15 30 0 0 
Finland 87.4 10 30 10 10 25 15 
France 59.8 10 5 10 15 20 40 
Germany 61.2 5 15 25 10 10 35 
Greece 84.6 10 25 30 0 25 10 
Hong Kong 72.1 0 35 25 0 30 10 
India 46.3 0 40 15 0 40 5 
Indonésia 81.4 15 30 15 0 25 15 
Ireland 90.1 50 40 0 5 0 5 
Italy 67.2 0 25 15 45 5 10 
Japan 19.8 15 5 0 5 25 50 
Malaysia 62.9 10 70 20 0 0 0 
Netherlands 77.4 40 20 10 10 5 15 
New Zealand 78.0 50 35 5 0 10 0 
Norway 85.7 15 40 25 0 20 0 
Portugal 96.0 0 70 25 5 0 0 
Singapore 68.9 5 25 20 0 35 15 
South Africa 55.5 55 40 0 0 0 5 
South Korea 62.7 20 45 10 0 15 10 
Spain 76.6 5 20 25 30 5 15 
Sweden 79.9 25 35 25 0 10 5 
Switzerland 76.6 5 25 30 0 10 30 
Taiwan 66.9 10 40 20 0 10 20 
Thailand 78.3 0 40 15 0 40 5 
Turkey 73.5 0 40 55 5 0 0 
UK 64.5 40 5 0 0 0 55 
USA 25.5 35 0 20 0 0 45 
Mean 70.2 18.1 28.9 17.3 7.7 12.0 15.9 
Median 74.3 10 30 15 0 10 10 
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                                                Panel B: Threshold 20% 
Country Financial Diverse Individuals Financial Government Widely 
 Institution Shareholders  Vehicle  Held 
Australia 10 0 0 0 5 85 
Austria 0 40 15 15 5 25 
Belgium 0 20 20 25 10 25 
Canada 0 5 15 0 0 80 
Chile 5 20 45 5 0 25 
Denmark 15 15 15 25 0 30 
Finland 0 30 5 5 20 40 
France 0 5 5 5 20 65 
Germany 0 15 20 0 10 55 
Greece 5 20 25 0 25 25 
Hong Kong 0 35 25 0 30 10 
India 0 35 10 0 35 20 
Indonesia 0 30 15 0 25 30 
Ireland 25 40 0 0 0 35 
Italy 0 20 15 15 5 45 
Japan 0 5 0 0 25 70 
Malaysia 10 70 20 0 0 0 
Netherlands 15 20 10 0 0 55 
New Zealand 30 35 5 0 10 20 
Norway 5 35 25 0 20 15 
Portugal 0 70 25 0 0 5 
Singapore 0 20 10 0 35 35 
South Africa 10 40 0 0 0 50 
South Korea 0 35 5 0 15 45 
Spain 0 10 25 5 0 60 
Sweden 15 35 25 0 5 20 
Switzerland 0 25 20 0 10 45 
Taiwan 0 30 10 0 5 55 
Thailand 0 25 5 0 40 30 
Turkey 0 40 55 5 0 0 
UK 15 5 0 0 0 80 
USA 0 0 15 0 0 85 
Mean 5.0 25.9 15.2 3.3 11.1 39.5 
Median 0 25 15 0 5 35 
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Table 2: Summary of Variables 
Anti-director rights is from La Porta et al (1998) and ranges from 0 to 6. Corruption perception index is from Transparency International (2005) and ranges from 0 to 10. Rule of law is from La Porta et al (1998) and varies from 0 to 10, with lower values for less 
tradition for law and order. Disclosure level is from Bhattacharya et al (2003), with higher value indicating more disclosure. The original source is the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). Liquidity ratio is from World Development 
Indicators and is defined as volume traded at a local stock exchange divided by the gross domestic product (GDP) - average from 1999 to 2003. Size of mutual fund industry is from Investment Company Institute (ICI) and relates the total net assets of mutual funds with 
GDP in 2005. Private credit is from World Bank and is defined by domestic credit provided by banking sector % of GDP 2004. GDP per capita in 2005 is from International Monetary Fund (IMF). Law is a dummie variable (1=common; 0=civil). Religion is a dummie 
variable (1=Catholic; 0=other). The median market capitalisation of the 20 largest firms by country, million dollar denominated, is from Worldscope (WS Item, WC07211). The median market-to-book of the 20 largest firms by country is also Worldscope. Market-to-
book is defined as total assets (Worldscope Item, WC 02999) minus book equity - defined as total assets minus total liabilities (WC 03351) and preferred stock (WC 03451) plus deferred taxes (WC 03263) and convertible debt (WC 18282) - plus market capitalisation 
(WC 08001), local currency denominated, divided by total assets. The median annualised volatility of the 20 largest firms by country is calculated using Datastream data, dollar denominated, considering weekly returns during 2000-2005. 
Panel A: Country-Level Variables 
Country Anti-Director Corruption Rule of  Disclosure Liquidity Size of Mutual Private GDP Law Religion 
 Rights Perc. Index Law  Level Ratio Fund Industry Credit per Cap.   
Australia 4 8.8 10.0  80 0.97 1.10 1.00 30.897 Common Other 
Austria 2 8.7 10.0  62 0.16 0.37 1.23 33.432 Civil Catholic 
Belgium 0 7.4 10.0  68 0.71 0.33 1.12 31.244 Civil Catholic 
Canada 5 8.4 10.0  75 1.02 0.50 0.97 34.273 Common Catholic 
Chile 5 7.3 7.02  78 0.83 0.15 0.70 11.937 Civil Catholic 
Denmark 2 9.5 10.0  75 0.58 0.31 1.66 34.740 Civil Other 
Finland 3 9.6 10.0  83 1.78 0.24 0.70 31.208 Civil Other 
France 3 7.5 8.98  78 0.88 0.67 1.07 29.187 Civil Catholic 
Germany 1 8.2 9.23  67 0.56 0.71 1.43 30.579 Civil Other 
Greece 2 4.3 6.18  61 0.80 0.16 1.05 22.392 Civil Other 
Hong Kong 5 8.3 8.22  73 3.39 2.83 1.49 33.479 Common Other 
India 5 2.9 4.17  61 0.30 0.06 0.60 3.320 Common Other 
Indonesia 2 2.2 3.98  NA 0.23 NA 0.71 4.459 Civil Other 
Ireland 4 7.4 7.80  81 0.67 3.01 1.18 40.610 Common Catholic 
Italy 1 5.0 8.33  66 0.53 0.27 1.05 28.534 Civil Catholic 
Japan 4 7.3 8.98  71 0.68 0.10 1.55 30.615 Civil Other 
Malaysia 4 5.1 6.78  79 1.41 NA 1.34 11.201 Common Other 
Netherlands 2 8.6 10.0  74 1.36 0.16 1.67 30.862 Civil Catholic 
New Zealand 4 9.6 10.0  NA 0.40 0.10 1.21 24.797 Common Other 
Norway 4 8.9 10.0  75 0.37 0.16 0.11 42.364 Civil Other 
Portugal 3 6.5 8.68  NA 0.47 0.17 1.51 19.335 Civil Catholic 
Singapore 4 9.4 8.57  79 1.59 NA 0.80 28.368 Common Other 
South Africa 5 4.5 4.42  79 1.54 0.31 0.85 12.161 Common Other 
South Korea 2 5.0 5.35  68 0.48 0.29 1.01 20.590 Civil Other 
Spain 4 7.0 7.80  72 0.76 0.30 1.39 26.320 Civil Catholic 
Sweden 3 9.2 10.0  83 1.14 0.34 1.13 29.926 Civil Other 
Switzerland 2 9.1 10.0  80 2.52 0.33 1.75 32.571 Civil Catholic 
Taiwan 3 5.9 8.52  58 1.02 0.19 1.67 27.721 Civil Other 
Thailand 2 3.8 6.25  66 0.38 NA 1.05 8.368 Common Other 
Turkey 2 3.5 5.18  58 0.33 0.07 0.60 7.950 Civil Other 
UK 5 8.6 8.57  85 1.59 0.26 1.58 30.436 Common Other 
USA 5 7.6 10.0  76 1.42 0.76 2.71 41.399 Common Other 
Mean 3.2 7.0 8.22  72.8 0.97 0.51 1.18 25.790   
Median 3.0 7.5 8.63  75 0.78 0.30 1.13 29.557   
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                                               Panel B: Firm-Level Variables 
Country Market Capitalisation Market-to-Book Volatility 
 (median) (median) (median) 
Australia 15.219 1.41 0.22 
Austria 4.077 1.23 0.27 
Belgium 6.896 1.34 0.25 
Canada 28.917 1.35 0.24 
Chile 2.763 1.24 0.27 
Denmark 4.014 1.51 0.29 
Finland 4.067 1.50 0.31 
France 47.826 1.19 0.29 
Germany 32.799 1.07 0.34 
Greece 4.483 1.38 0.30 
Hong Kong 13.974 1.14 0.30 
India 10.914 1.72 0.41 
Indonesia 2.242 1.52 0.49 
Ireland 2.979 1.57 0.27 
Italy 17.247 1.13 0.28 
Japan 49.882 1.11 0.34 
Malaysia 4.206 1.22 0.20 
Netherlands 14.195 1.39 0.34 
New Zealand 1.084 1.49 0.26 
Norway 3.125 1.51 0.35 
Portugal 2.360 1.18 0.26 
Singapore 4.108 1.15 0.28 
South Africa 10.106 1.56 0.35 
South Korea 12.919 1.20 0.46 
Spain 16.121 1.31 0.23 
Sweden 13.464 1.36 0.30 
Switzerland 16.367 1.74 0.32 
Taiwan 9.321 1.41 0.35 
Thailand 2.814 1.24 0.36 
Turkey 2.919 1.23 0.56 
UK 71.490 1.62 0.26 
USA 155.476 1.93 0.27 
Mean 18.387 1.37 0.31 
Median 9.714 1.36 0.29 
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           Table 3: Univariate Analysis by Category of Ultimate Owner 
The table compares means of firms (in percentage) by category of ultimate owners and t-statistics based on the 20% percent and the 
5% threshold, for a sample of the largest firms by country. All ultimate owners representing more than 5% of voting rights are 
included in the sample. However, if the analysis imposes a 20% threshold (Panel B), and the sum of voting rights is lower than 20%, a 
firm is widely held. Means for countries are grouped according to the following criteria: Legal environment; Anti-director rights; 
Corruption perception index; Rule of law; Disclosure level; Religion; Liquidity ratio; Private credit; GDP per capita; Size of mutual 
fund industry; Market capitalisation by firm (country median); Market-to-book (country median); Volatility by firm (country median). 
*, **, and ***, indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. N is the number of countries. 
Panel A: 5% threshold 
 N Financial Diverse Individuals Financial Government Widely 
  Institution Shareholders Vehicle  Held 
Means        
Common 12 28.8 28.3 11.3 0.4 13.3 17.9 
Civil 20 11.8 29.3 21.0 12.0 11.3 14.8 
t – statistic (2.27)** (-0.13) (-2.45)** (-3.74)*** (0.38) (0.46) 
High Anti-director rights 15 25.7 26.3 14.3 3.7 11.3 18.7 
Low Anti-director rights 17 11.5 31.2 20.0 11.2 12.6 13.5 
t – statistic (2.15)** (-0.78) (-1.28) (-1.86)  (-0.28) (0.83) 
High Corruption Perc. Index 16 23.8 21.3 15.3 6.6 11.6 21.6 
Low Corruption Perc. Index 16 12.5 36.6 19.4 8.8 12.5 10.3 
t – statistic (1.72)* (-2.77)*** (-0.92) (-0.50) (-0.21) (1.99)* 
High Rule of Law 16 22.2 23.4 15.3 9.1 9.7 20.3 
Low Rule of Law 16 14.1 34.4 19.4 6.3 14.4 11.6 
t – statistic  (1.21) (-1.87)* (-0.92) (0.65) (-1.05) (1.51) 
High Disclosure Level 15 27.0 24.7 15.7 5.0 8.3 19.3 
Low Disclosure Level 14 7.9 30.0 19.6 11.8 16.1 14.6 
t – statistic (3.19)*** (-0.89) (-0.83) (-1.45) (-1.66) (0.75) 
Catholic 11 16.8 28.2 18.6 16.8 5.5 14.1 
Others 21 18.8 29.3 16.7 2.9 15.5 16.9 
t – statistic (-0.25) (-0.17) (0.42) (2.95)*** (-2.83)*** (-0.52) 
High Liquidity Ratio 16 23.7 23.7 15.3 10 8 19.3 
Low Liquidity Ratio 16 15.0 31.2 19.6 7.3 12.7 14.2 
t – statistic (1.18) (-1.21) (-0.81) (0.56) (-1.11) (0.76) 
High Size of Mutual Fund Ind. 14 19.4 22.1 15.7 10.7 7.5 20.0 
Low Size of Mutual Fund Ind. 14 6.8 32.1 18.9 6.8 12.9 13.9 
t – statistic (2.51)** (-1.66) (-0.63) -0.82 (-1.31) (0.92) 
High Private Credit 16 20.6 29.7 15.9 7.8 7.5 18.4 
Low Private Credit 16 15.6 28.1 18.8 7.5 16.6 13.4 
t – statistic (0.73) (0.25) (-0.63) -0.07 (-2.14)** (0.84) 
Large GDP per Capita 16 24.1 21.6 14.4 8.1 9.7 22.2 
Small GDP per Capita 16 12.2 36.3 20.3 7.2 14.4 9.7 
t – statistic (1.82)* (-2.63)** (-1.36) -0.21 (-1.05) (2.25)** 
High Market Capitalisation 16 22.2 20.3 14.1 7.2 11.3 25.0 
Low Market Capitalisation 16 14.1 37.5 20.6 8.1 12.8 6.9 
t – statistic (1.21) (-3.22)*** (-1.51) (-0.21) (-0.34) (3.61)*** 
High Market-to-Book 16 27.2 26.6 13.8 3.4 11.6 17.5 
Low Market-to-Book 16 9.1 31.3 20.9 11.9 12.5 14.4 
t – statistic (3.01)*** (-0.77) (-1.67) (-2.06)** (-0.21) (0.52) 
High Volatility 16 14.1 31.6 19.4 2.5 18.1 14.4 
Low Volatility 16 22.2 26.3 15.3 12.8 5.9 17.5 
t – statistic (-1.21) (0.87) (0.92) (-2.61)** (3.08)*** (-0.52) 
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                                        Panel B: 20% threshold 
 N Financial Diverse Individuals Financial Government Widely 
  Institution Shareholders Vehicle  Held 
Means        
Common 12 8.3 25.8 8.8 0.0 12.9 44.2 
Civil 20 3.0 26.0 19.0 5.3 10.0 36.8 
t – statistic (1.63) (-0.02) (-2.66)** (-2.87)*** (0.55) (0.74) 
High Anti-director rights 15 7.3 23.7 13.0 0.7 10.7 44.7 
Low Anti-director rights 17 2.9 27.9 17.1 5.6 11.5 35.0 
t – statistic (1.53) (-0.69) (-0.90) (-2.25)** (-0.18) (1.09) 
High Corruption Perc. Index 16 6.6 20.0 13.1 3.1 10.6 46.6 
Low Corruption Perc. Index 16 3.4 31.9 17.2 3.4 11.6 32.5 
t – statistic (1.10) (-2.07)** (-0.91) (-0.13) (-0.21) (1.68) 
High Rule of Law 16 5.6 22.2 13.8 4.7 8.8 45 
Low Rule of Law 16 4.4 29.7 16.6 1.9 13.4 34.1 
t – statistic (0.43) (-1.25) (-0.62) (1.16) (-1.06) (1.28) 
High Disclosure Level 15 7.3 23.0 13.3 2.7 7.7 46.0 
Low Disclosure Level 14 1.4 25.0 17.1 4.6 14.6 37.1 
t – statistic  (2.58)** (-0.34) (-0.78) (-0.73) (-1.50) (0.99) 
Catholic 11 4.1 25.0 17.7 6.4 4.5 42.3 
Others 21 5.5 26.4 13.8 1.7 14.5 38.1 
t – statistic (-0.45) (-0.21) (0.86) (1.67) (-2.81)*** (0.48) 
High Liquidity Ratio 16 5.3 22.5 14.4 0.9 9.7 47.2 
Low Liquidity Ratio 16 4.7 29.4 15.9 5.6 12.5 31.9 
t – statistic (0.22) (-1.15) (-0.35) (-2.01)** (-0.63) (1.84)* 
High Size of Mutual Fund Ind. 14 5.4 20.4 14.3 5.4 6.8 47.9 
Low Size of Mutual Fund Ind. 14 5.4 28.6 16.8 2.1 11.4 35.7 
t – statistic (0.00) (-1.38) (-0.49) (1.18) (-1.17) (1.32) 
High Private Credit 16 7.8 28.1 14.4 2.8 6.3 40.6 
Low Private Credit 16 2.2 23.8 15.9 3.8 15.9 38.4 
t – statistic (2.08)** (0.72) (-0.35) (-0.38) (-2.35)*** (0.25) 
Large GDP per Capita 16 6.3 20.3 13.1 4.4 8.8 47.2 
Small GDP per Capita 16 3.8 31.6 17.2 2.2 13.4 31.9 
t – statistic (0.88) (-1.95)* (-0.91) (0.89) (-1.06) (1.84)* 
High Market Capitalisation 16 4.1 18.1 11.9 1.6 10.0 54.4 
Low Market Capitalisation 16 5.9 33.8 18.4 5.0 12.2 24.7 
t – statistic (-0.65) (-2.88)** (-1.50) (-1.43) (-0.49) (4.31)*** 
High Market-to-Book 16 9.1 24.7 11.3 1.9 10.0 43.1 
Low Market-to-Book 16 0.9 27.2 19.1 4.7 12.2 35.9 
t – statistic (3.28)*** (-0.41) (-1.82)* (-1.16) (-0.49) (0.83) 
High Volatility 16 3.1 28.4 15.9 0.6 16.6 35.3 
Low Volatility 16 6.9 23.4 14.4 5.9 5.6 43.8 
t – statistic (-1.34) (0.82) (0.35) (-2.32)** (2.72)*** (-0.98) 
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Table 4: Multivariate Analysis of Cross-Country Variations on Widely Held Firms 
The table reports the results of OLS regressions for a sample of 32 countries, considering 20% threshold. The dependent variable is mean 
percentage of widely held firms by country.  Independent variables are defined in Table 3. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are 
reported in parentheses.  
 
Law 4.432 4.014 3.778 4.434    
 (0.54) (0.51) (0.50) (0.59) 
 
 
Corruption Perc. Index 0.152 0.855 1.262   1.398  
 (0.06) (0.30) (0.85)   
 
(1.02)   
Rule of Law -0.442 0.522  1.412   1.491 
 (-0.12) (0.16)  (0.83) 
 
 (0.98) 
Religion 3.572 3.807 4.017 3.578    
 (0.64) (0.69) (0.78) (0.67) 
 
  
GDP per Capita 6.471    5.931   
 (0.78)     (1.21)    
Market Capitalisation 14.549 15.229 15.323 15.118 14.684 15.441 15.250 
 (7.70) *** (8.58) *** (9.83) *** (9.26) *** (8.49) *** (9.76) *** (9.04) *** 
Market-to-Book 14.960 13.595 13.674 13.537 16.657 14.801 15.298 
 (0.93)  (0.83)  (0.85)  (0.84) (1.46)  (1.21) (1.26)  
Adj. R2 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.59 0.59 0.59 
N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
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